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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court err in granting the Order Dismissing 
Action and Vacating Judgement to the defendants against the 
plaintiffs which resulted in the dismissal of the Judgment 
against the defendant, when Plaintiff had properly filed a 
foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act? 
II. Did the District Court err in not granting full faith and 
credit to the valid Oklahoma judgment properly filed in Utah, 
contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of United States 
Constitution? 
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limitations as provided by the Utah Foreign Judgments Act, when 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution allows the 
forum state to apply it's statute of limitation on foreign 
judgments properly filed in the forum state? 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAN ENERGY, f/k/a ENERGY CATALYST 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CARL MARTIN, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
1 SUPREME COURT 
1 Civil No. 87-1916 
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
Appeal from Ruling, June 12, 1989 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Honorable Ray M.Harding, District Judge 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3), (1986 Supp). 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is based upon a judgment rendered in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma and properly 
filed in Utah under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. The Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County granted a Motion to Stay 
Execution once it received an order dated July 14, 1988 from the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma stating 
that the Oklahoma judgment was now dormant in Oklahoma. The 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County granted the 
vi 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss Action and Vacate Judgment on or 
about June 12, 1989- Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Notice of 
Appeal with the Fourth Judicial Court as Directed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure on July 12, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about September 21, 1982, Plaintiff/Appellant, Pan 
Energy, obtained a judgment against Defendant/Respondent, Carl 
Martin in the United Stated District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma. 
On or about August 20, 1987, Plaintiff/Appellant commenced 
an action under Utah Law by the filing of the Foreign Judgment. 
The Foreign Judgment was entered and notice was given on or about 
August 24, 1987. 
A Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings was issued by 
the District Court on September 22, 1987 and was served upon the 
Defendant/Respondent. The two parties entered into a 
Stipulation continuing the Supplemental Proceedings without a 
date until such time as the Defendant/Respondent obtained a 
hearing before the United States District Court before the 
Northern District of Oklahoma as to the propriety of its Motion 
to Vacate the Oklahoma Judgment on the grounds of statutory 
limitation. 
The District Court based upon the Stipulation of the 
parties, stayed the action between the Plaintiff/Appellant and 
the Defendant/Respondent pending resolution of the defendant's 
vii 
motion to distinguish the original Oklahoma Judgment, the 
Defendant/Respondent was required to post a $57,000 bond in the 
form of a letter of credit from a Utah Banking Institution. 
On or about July 14, 1988, the Oklahoma Court ruled that 
the original judgment was dormant and thereby not enforceable 
because no Writ of Execution had been filed within Oklahoma's 
five year limitation period for enforcing judgments. However, 
the Oklahoma Court specifically found that its ruling did not 
determine the enforceability of the Foreign Judgment in Utah, but 
stated that the status of the Utah Foreign Judgment must be 
determined according to Utah Law. 
On or about August 11, 1989, Plaintiff/Appellant filed the 
instant Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
viii 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Motion to Dismiss Action and Vacate Judgment granted in 
favor of the Defendant/Respondent was improper, A valid judgment 
from any of Utah sister states or any of the Federal courts 
should be given full faith and credit in Utah. The Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act is the controlling statute in Utah when a valid 
foreign judgment is properly filed in one of the District Courts 
in Utah. The Plaintiff/Appellant properly filed a judgment 
rendered in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma in the Fourth District Court for Utah 
County, State of Utah. Once that judgment has been filed it 
becomes a Utah lien and is subject to all laws in Utah that 
govern the enforcement of judgment liens. The statutes that 
control the enforcement of judgment liens in Utah are applied 
equally to domestic as well as foreign judgments liens in Utah. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution of the 
United States requires no more or no less. When there is a 
conflict of law between the foreign State's statute of limitation 
and the forum State's statute of limitation, the forum State's 
statute controls. 
The Motion to Dismiss Action and Vacate Judgment granted by 
the Fourth District Court should not be affirmed in favor of the 
Defendant/Respondent. But, rather, the Plaintiff/Appellant 
should be allowed to enforce it's valid Utah lien against the 
Defendant/Respondent in compliance with the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MOTION DISMISSING ACTION AND VACATING JUDGMENT WAS 
IMPROPER UNDER THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT. 
The Supreme Court should reverse the District Court's entry 
of the Motion Dismissing Action and Vacating Judgment. Further, 
the Supreme Court should remand the case and order that the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act1 statutes are controlling once a foreign 
judgment has been properly filed, as in this case. Article IV § 
1 of the Untied States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may 
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. 
Const, art. IV § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1977). 
A. The filing of the Oklahoma judgment in Utah was timely 
and properly filed to give it lien judgment status in Utah. 
Pan Energy, brought a civil action against the above named 
defendant April 23, 1982. On or about September 21, 1982 the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Oklahoma rendered a judgment in favor of Pan Energy. The date of 
the judgment is of main concern here. The Oklahoma statute of 
limitation allows five years for execution of the judgment from 
the date that a judgment is rendered. The effective duration of 
an Oklahoma judgment is controlled by that state's dormancy 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l - 8 (1983). 
2 
statute, which has been codified as Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 
735, 759 (1988).2 The time period that the Oklahoma statute 
allowed for the collection of this judgment began on September 
21, 1982 and ran through September 21, 1987. 
Pan Energy commenced this action under Utah Law by the 
filing the Oklahoma judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act3 
on or about August 20, 1987. Section 78--22a-2 of the Foreign 
Judgment Act describes the process for filing a foreign judgment 
as follows: 
Definition - Filing status of foreign judgments. 
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, "foreign judgment" 
means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the 
United States or of any other court whose acts are 
entitled to full faith and credit in this state. 
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in 
accordance with an appropriate act of Congress or an 
appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the county 
clerk of any county in Utah. The clerk of the district 
court shall treat the foreign judgment in all respects 
as a judgment of a district court of Utah. A judgment 
filed under this chapter has the same effect and is 
subject to the same procedures, defenses and 
proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or 
staying, as a judgment of a district court of this 
state and is subject to enforcement and satisfaction in 
like manner.4 
These requirements were met at the time of the filing.5 The 
notice of a foreign judgment was entered on or about August 24, 
1987.6 Section 78-22a-3 of the Utah Code provides that: 
2
 See Addendum 1. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l (1983). 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-2 (1983) emphasis added. 
5
 See Addendum 3. 
6
 See Addendum 4. 3 
Notice of filing. 
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, 
at the time of filing a foreign judgment, shall file an 
affidavit with the clerk of the district court stating 
the last known post-office address of the judgment 
debtor and the judgment creditor. 
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and 
affidavit, the clerk of the district court shall notify 
the judgment debtor that the judgment has been filed. 
Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the 
affidavit. The clerk shall record the date the notice 
is mailed in the register of actions. The notice shall 
include the name and post-office address of the 
judgment creditor and the name and address of the 
judgment creditor's attorney, if any. 
(3) No execution of other process for the enforcement 
of a foreign judgment filed under this chapter may 
issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed.7 
This notice was sent to the judgment debtor (Carl Martin) at his 
last known address by court clerk on or about August 24, 1987.8 
Personal service was also given concerning this action on or 
about September 30/ 1987.9 Once the judgment has been filed 
under the above statute it becomes a lien as stated in Section 
78-22a-5, which provides that: 
Lien. 
(1) A Foreign judgment filed under this chapter becomes 
a lien as provided in section 78-22-1 if a stay of 
execution has not been granted. 
(2) If the requirements of this chapter are satisfied, 
the foreign judgment becomes a lien upon the judgment 
debtor's property on the date it is docketed.1 ° 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3 (1986) (emphasis added). 
8
 See Addendum 3. 
9
 See Addendum 5. 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-5 (1986) (emphasis added). 
4 
Once the foreign judgment becomes a lien, § 78-22-1 of the Utah 
code controls as to the length of time the lien holder has to 
enforce the judgment. Section 78-22-1 provides that: 
Lien of judgment. 
From the time judgment of the district court or circuit 
court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk 
of the district court of the county it becomes a lien 
upon all real property of the judgment debtor, not 
exempt from execution, in the county in which the 
judgment is entered, owned by him at the time or by him 
thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien. 
A transcript of judgment rendered in a district court 
or circuit court of this state, in any county thereof, 
may be filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of 
the district court of any other county, and when so 
filed and docketed it shall have, for purposes of lien 
and enforcement, the same force and effect as a 
judgment entered in the district court in such county. 
The lien shall continue for eight yesars unless the 
judgment is previously satisfied or unless the 
enforcement of the judgment is stayeid on appeal by the 
execution of a sufficient undertaking as provided by 
law, in which case the lien of the judgment ceases.11 
The judgment was properly and timely filed in Utah. The 
effective dates for the judgment from Oklahoma were September 21, 
1982 through September 21, 1987. Therefore, the judgment of 
Utah's sister state of Oklahoma was in effect and of legal force 
when it was filed in Utah. The Defendant/Respondent has argued 
that Utah should give full faith and credit to the July 14, 
198812 ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma, but not the original judgment issued by 
that same Court on or about September 21, 1982.13 The full faith 
11
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1977) (emphasis added). 
12
 See addendum 9. 
13
 See addendum 2. 
5 
and credit clause does not allow Utah to choose which judgments 
of a sister state Utah will enforce, but is bound to enforce them 
as they come to the state. The original judgment against the 
judgment debtor should be given full faith and credit as the 
constitution of the United States requires.14 Accordingly, the 
appropriate effective time for enforcement of this judgment lien 
in Utah began on September 21, 1982 and continues through 
September 21, 1990. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant did not choose Utah as the forum to 
bring this action, but rather, followed the judgment debtor to 
this state. The Plaintiff/Appellant should not be penalized for 
using the appropriate laws of the state that the judgment debtor 
has chosen to live. 
B. The Motion for Stay of Execution of the Utah lien was 
proper only to determine if the Oklahoma judgment was valid. 
Once a valid judgment of a sister state is filed in a 
district court of Utah it becomes a lien in Utah. Section 78-
22a-5, provides in the pertinent part that "(1) A Foreign 
judgment filed under this chapter becomes a lien as provided in 
section 78-22-1 if a stay of execution has not been granted." No 
Stay of execution had been granted at the time of the filing of 
the foreign judgment and therefore, the judgment became a lien in 
Utah. 
This Court has addressed the question of reexamination of 
14
 U.S. Const, art. IV S 1. 
6 
foreign judgments in the Data Management Systems, Inc.15 case in 
which Data Management Systems obtained a default judgement 
against EDP a Utah corporation doing business in Wisconsin. The 
Wisconsin judgment was filed in Salt Lake County for the purpose 
of enforcement, pursuant to our Utah Foreign Judgment Act. EDP 
claimed it was not aware of the judgment until it was filed in 
Utah and Data Management Systems sought enforcement of the lien 
that the filing created. This Court stated that: 
Neither Rule 60(b) nor 78-22a-2 should be interpreted 
in a manner which defeats the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. . . . 
Neither Rule 60(b) nor our Utah Foreign judgment 
Act allows our Utah courts to reopen, reexamine, or 
alter a foreign judgment duly filed in this state, 
absent a showing of fraud or lack of jurisdiction or 
due process in the rendering state. Only those 
defenses may be raised to destroy the full faith and 
credit owed to the foreign judgment sought to be 
enforced under the Foreign Judgments Act. Morris v. 
Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 67 S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488 (1947); 
Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1976); 
Matson v. Matson, Minn. 333 N.W.2d 862 (1983); Morris 
Lapidus Associates v. Airportels, Inc., 240 
Pa.Super.Ct. 80, 361 A.2d 660, 664 (1976); Jones v. 
Roach, 118 Ariz. 146, 575 P.2d 345 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1977). 
Utah's Foreign Judgment Act does not diminish the 
finality of foreign adjudications or the full faith and 
credit obligation owned thereon. It cannot create 
substantive rights in a judgment debtor which conflict 
with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. No power is 
conferred upon our state courts to entertain a Rule 
60(b) motion for relief from a foreign judgment in 
order to avoid its enforcement, except to the extent 
permitted by full faith and credit. The rights and 
defenses preserved by the Act are only those which the 
debtor may constitutionally raise. To interpret the 
language of our statute otherwise would not afford any 
finality to foreign judgments and would be contrary to 
15
 Data Management Svs., Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377, 
(Utah 1985). 
7 
the constitutional mandate.16 
The Utah Courts should not reexamine the judgments of her sister 
states. This Court in EDP has also given guide lines for Utah 
Courts to follow in evaluating the foreign judgment filed in 
Utah as follows: 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent 
the judgment debtor from collaterally attacking a 
foreign judgment on the ground of fraud or want of 
jurisdiction or due process of law. Hobelman Motors, 
Inc. v. Allred, Utah, 685 P.2d 544 (1984); Van Kleek 
Creamery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Products Co., 24 Utah 
2d 63, 465 P.2d 544 (1970). . . . But, although our 
Court may inquire into the jurisdictional basis of a 
foreign judgment , a determination by the rendering 
state on the issue of jurisdiction is res judicata when 
that issue is fully and fairly litigated there. 
Underwriter's National Assurance Co., 455 U.S. at 705-
06, 102 S.Ct. at 1366-67; Purfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. at 
111-113, 84 S.Ct. at 245-46; Clarkson v. Western 
Heritage, 627 P.2d at 74.17 
The issues a Utah Court considers are if the foreign court had 
jurisdiction, if the foreign state allowed both parties access to 
due process of the law and if there was an absence of fraud in 
the judgment. 
The Restatement of the Law of Conflicts explains that "[a] 
judgment will be recognized and enforced in other states even 
though an error of fact or of law was made in the proceedings 
before judgment, except as stated in § 105."18 This Court has 
stated in EDP that if a foreign court has made an err or mistake 
16
 EDP, 709 P.2d 377 at 381. 
17
 EDP, 709 P.2d 377 at 379. 
18
 Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 106 (1969). 
Section 105 ,of this same Restatement is titled Judgment Rendered 
by Court Laking Competence. 
8 
of law the Utah Courts will enforce the judgment. "Even if it 
appears that the rendering court has erred or ruled contrary to 
statute, we will not refuse to enforce that determination when 
that court has fundamental jurisdiction. Thorley v. Superior 
Court. County of San Diego, 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 910, 144 Cal.Rptr. 
557, 563 (1978)." The U.S. District Court In Oklahoma had 
jurisdiction over the persons, because Pan Energy and Carl Martin 
had diverse citizenship.19 Pan Energy is a corporation in 
Montana2 ° doing business in Oklahoma2 x and Carl Martin was a 
resident of Idaho.22 The same Court had jurisdiction over the 
subject mater of this litigation. This siction was brought 
against Mr. Martin because of his failure to repay a debt. 
Therefore, The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Oklahoma had jurisdiction over this litigation and Utah should 
give full faith and credit to it's judgment. 
C. The most recent finding of the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Oklahoma demonstrate the validity of 
it's judgment at the time the Oklahoma judgment was filed in 
Utah. 
The U.S. District Court in Oklahoma handed down a decision 
on July 14, 1988 that ordered "the judgment entered against 
Defendant on September 21, 1982 is unenforceable. Defendant's 
19
 28 U.S.C. 1332 (1986). 
2
 ° Pan Energy changed its name from Energy Catalyst Company 
to Pan Energy Resources, Inc, March 16, 1984. See addendum 6. 
2 1
 See addendum 7. 
2 2
 See addendum 8. 
9 
Motion to Declare Judgment Dormant is sustained."23 
Specifically, in footnote 3 on page 4 of that opinion Judge 
Thomas R. Brett District Court Judge stated that, " Tfjhe Court 
does not rule on the enforceability of the judgment in Utah or 
Idaho. That issue is determined bv Utah's and Idaho's law 
regarding foreign judgments and their enforceability."24 In 
addition, Judge Brett stated that "Oklahoma strictly applies her 
dormancy statutes to foreign judgments. Chandler-Frates & Reitz 
v. Kostich, 630 P.2d 1287 (Okla. 1984). "25 Utah should apply 
it's Foreign Judgment Act strictly to all foreign judgments. 
This would allow a valid foreign judgment properly filed in the 
State of Utah the same grounds and time limits to gain 
enforcement of the Utah lien as is prescribed for all domestic 
judgments. That would ensure that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause is completely followed in this state. 
II. UTAH GRANTS FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE JUDGMENTS OF SISTER 
STATES. 
Utah Courts have continually complied with the 
constitutional requirement to give full faith and credit to her 
sister state's valid court judgments.26 This Court stated that: 
The final determinations by the courts of one state are 
2 3
 See addendum 9. 
24
 See addendum 9 at 4 (emphasis added). 
2 5
 See addendum 9 at 3. 
26
 Clarkson v. Western Heritage, Inc.. 627 P.2d 72 (Utah 
1981); Fullenwider Co. v. Patterson. 611 P.2d 387 (1980). 
10 
entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of its 
sister states. U.S. Const, art. IV § 1; Underwriter's 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life and 
Accident and Health Insurance Guaranty Association. 445 
U.S. 691, 102 S. Ct. 1357, 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982); 
Purfee V. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 
186 (1963); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 
339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940), reh'q denied, 312 U.S. 712, 
61 S.Ct 548, 86 L.Ed 1143 (1941). . . . The credit we 
afford final judgments is generously full and not 
parsimoniously partial Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 
40, 59 S.Ct. 3,6, 83 L.Ed. 26 (1938).27 
In the instant case a valid judgment was rendered in a U.S. 
District Court in Oklahoma and at the time this judgment was 
filed in Utah the Oklahoma judgment was still valid.28 The 
filing of the original judgment in Utah created a Utah lien that 
should be enforced according to the Utah Foreign Judgments Act. 
A. Utah's Laws should be used in determining the method of 
enforcement for a Utah lien. 
The Restatement of Conflicts Laws provides that "[t]he local 
law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of 
another state is enforced."29 The rational behind this section 
is described in comment a, b and c of § 99, which states: 
a. Rational. The methods by which a sister State 
judgment is to be enforced are determined by local law 
of the forum, subject to the qualification that they 
cannot be made so complex and expensive as to make 
enforcement of a sister State judgment unduly 
difficult. Broderick v. Rosner. 294 U.S. 629 (1935). . 
b. Method of enforcement. The local law of the forum 
27
 EDP, 709 P.2d at 379. 
2 8
 See addendum 2 and 3. 
29
 Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 99 (1969). 
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determines whether a foreign judgment for recovery of 
money can be enforced only by bringing a new action 
upon the judgment in the state of the forum and by 
obtaining a new judgment there (see § 100). . . . The 
local law of the forum also determines the methods 
for enforcing a foreign judgment providing for the 
recovery of property or ordering the defendant to do 
some act other than the payment of money (see § 102). 
c. Federal judgments. By act of Congress, Judgments 
for the recovery of money or property rendered in a 
federal district court may be registered in another 
district without the necessity of bringing an action 
and obtaining a new local judgment. Judgments so 
registered "have the same effect as a judgment of the 
district court of the district where registered and may 
be enforced in like manner." (28 U.S.C. S 1963). . . 
3 0 
. 
This restatement demonstrates that the prevailing thinking in 
this area of the law is that the forum state applies it's own 
procedures to enforce a judgment that is correctly filed in the 
forum state. The Supreme Court of Alaska has expressed this same 
viewpoint in the Lillearaven v. Tenas31 case when they stated "it 
being the traditional approach of the American courts to 
distinguish between substance and procedure and hold that 
procedure matters are governed by the law of the forum."32 The 
method of enforcement is a matter of procedure and should 
therefore, be governed by the forum states laws. In the case at 
bar, the lien laws of Utah should govern the procedures by which 
the foreign judgment now a Utah lien is enforced in the State of 
Utah. 
30
 Id. comments a, b, c, (1969). 
31
 Lillearaven v. Tenas, 375 P.2d 139 (1962). 
32
 Lillearaven. 375 P.2d 139 at 140-41); Hamilton v. 
Seattle Marine & Fishing Supply. 562 P.2d 333, 337 (Alaska 1977). 
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III. UTAH'S STATUTES ARE THE APPROPRIATE STATUTES TO DETERMINE 
THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT A JUDGMENT LIEN IS ENFORCEABLE IN THIS 
STATE. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has established 
policies for the enforcement of foreign judgments in a sister 
state. These policies have been applied since very early times 
The United States Supreme Court stated that: 
Such being the Faith, credit and effect , to be 
given to a judgment of one state in another, by the 
Constitution and the act of Congress, the point under 
consideration will be determined by settling what is 
the nature of a plea of the statute of limitations. 
Is it a plea that settles the right of a party on a 
contract or judgment, or one that bars the remedy? 
Whatever diversity of opinion there may be among 
jurists upon this point, we think it well settled to be 
a plea to the remedy; and consequently that the lex 
fori must prevail. . . . It would be strange, if in 
the now well understood rights of a nation to organize 
their judicial tribunals according to their notions of 
policy, it should be conceded to therni in every other 
respect than that of prescribing the time within which 
suits shall be litigated in their Court. Prescription 
is a thing of policy , growing out of experience of its 
necessity; and the time after which suits or actions 
shall be barred, has been, from a remote antiquity, 
fixed by every nation, in virtue of that sovereignty 
by which it exercises its legislation for all persons 
and property within its jurisdiction. This being the 
foundation of the right to pass statutes of 
prescription or limitation, may not our states, under 
our system, exercise this right in virtue of their 
sovereignty? or is it to be conceded to them in every 
other particular, than that of barring the remedy upon 
judgments of other states by lapse of time? The states 
use this right upon judgments rendered in their own 
Courts; and the common law raises the presumption of 
payment of a judgement after the lapse of twenty years. 
May they not then limit the time for remedies upon the 
judgments of other states, and alter the common law by 
statute. fixing a less or larger time for such 
presumption. and altogether barring suits upon such 
judgments, if they shall not be brought within the time 
stated by statute? It certainly will not be contended 
that judgment creditors of other states shall be put 
13 
upon a better footing, in regard to a state's right to 
legislate in this particular, than the judgment 
creditor of the state in which the judgment was 
obtained. . . . In other words, may not the law of a 
state fix different times for barring the remedy in a 
suit upon a judgment of another state, and for those of 
its own tribunal? We use this mode of argument to 
show the unreasonableness of a contrary doctrine. But 
the point might have been shortly dismissed with this 
sage declaration, that there is no direct 
constitutional inhibition upon states, nor any clause 
in the Constitution from which it can be even plausibly 
inferred, that the states may not legislate upon the 
remedy in suits upon the judgments of other states, 
exclusive of all interference with their merits. It 
being settled that the statute of limitations may bar 
recoveries upon foreign judgments; that the effect 
intended to be given under our Constitution to 
judgments, is, that they are conclusive only as 
regards the merits; the common law principle then 
applies to suits upon them, that they must be brought 
within the period prescribed by the local law, the lex 
fori, or the suit will be barred. 
It is, therefore, our opinion, that the statute of 
limitations of Georgia can be pleaded to an action in 
that state, founded upon a judgment rendered in the 
state of South Carolina.33 
The Supreme Court clearly expressed itself on the subject of 
the forum state applying their own statute of limitation once the 
foreign judgment has been brought into and enforcement sought in 
the forum state. The Supreme Court reinforces their comments in 
a more recent case as follows: 
Long ago, we held that applying the statute of 
limitation of the forum to a foreign substantive right 
did not deny full faith and credit, McElmovle v. Cohen, 
13 Pet. 312 (1939); Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407 
(1950); Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22 (1857). Recently 
we referred to H. . . the well-established principle of 
conflict of law that 'If action is barred by the 
33
 M\Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327-28 (1839); 
Bacon v. Howard, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 22, 25 (1857). 
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statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be 
maintained though action is not barred in the state 
where the action arose.' Restatement, Conflict of Laws 
§ 604 (1934)." Order of United Commercial Travelers v. 
Wolfe. 331 U.S. 586, 607 (1947).34 
The holding of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.35 case was quoted by this 
Court in the Rhoades v. Wright36 case as follows: 
The rule that the limitations of the forum state 
apply (which this Court has said meets the requirements 
of the full faith and credit) is the usual conflicts 
rule of the states. However, there have been divergent 
views when a foreign statutory right unknown to the 
common law has a period of limitation included in the 
section creating the right. The Alcibama statute here 
involved created such a right and contain a built-in 
limitation. The view is held in some jurisdictions 
that such a limitation is so intimately connected with 
the right that it must be enforced in the forum state 
along with the substantive right. 
We are not concerned with the reasons which have 
led some states for their own purposes to adopt the 
foreign limitation, instead of their own, in such a 
situation. The question here is whexther the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause compels them to do so. Our 
prevailing rule is that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not compel the forum state to use the 
period of limitation of the foreign state. We see no 
reason in the present situation to graft an exception 
onto it. Differences based upon whether the foreign 
right was known to the common law or upon the 
arrangement of the code of the foreign state are too 
unsubstantial to form the basis for constitutional 
distinctions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.37 
Both Courts were expressing the same idea, that the forum state's 
34
 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516-17 (1953). 
35
 id. 
36
 Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980), cert, 
denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
37
 Wells, 345 U.S. 514 at 517-18; Rhoades, 622 P.2d 343 at 
350; Strictland v. Watt, 453 F.2d 383, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1972). 
15 
procedures for enforcement should be used rather than the foreign 
state's. The Arizona Court of Appeals has also followed the 
Supreme Courts finding in Wells in the case of Eschenhaaen v. 
Zika.38 It added the that "[t]his is true not only for 
limitations periods for filing causes of actions but also for 
limitations periods for enforcing judgment."39 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court 
dissented in the Union National Bank v. Lamb40 case, but gave 
some interpretation of the policy discussed here. He stated 
that: 
The Court finds that Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 
449, is "dispositive of the merits" of this case. I 
agree that that case demands the remand of this one; 
more that that can be found only by misconceiving what 
this case is about or what Roche v. McDonald decided. 
2. Considerations of policy lying behind the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, however, are by no means so 
forcibly presented where the issue is simply whether 
the forum must respect the limitation period attached 
to a foreign judgment or whether it may apply its own. 
This Court has accordingly held that a State may refuse 
to enforce the judgment of another State brought later 
than its own statute of limitations permits even 
though the judgment would still have been enforceable 
in the State which rendered it. M^Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 
Pet. 312; Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22. 
3. Conversely, where the enforcement of a 
judgment by State A is sought in State B, which has a 
longer limitation period than State A, State B is 
plainly free to enter its own judgment upon the basis 
of State A's original judgment, even though that 
38
 Eschenhaaen v. Zika, 696 P.2d 1362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
39
 Eschenhaaen. 696 P.2d 1362 at 1365. 
40
 Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb. 337 U.S. 38 (1949). 
16 
judgment would no longer be enforceable in State A. If 
enforcement of State B's new judgment is then sought in 
State A, State A cannot refuse to enforce it without 
violating the principle that the State where 
enforcement of a judgment of a judgment is sought 
cannot look behind the judgment. That was the 
situation in Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, and so we 
there held.4 x 
The Oklahoma Supreme has addressed the issue of conflict of 
laws between two sister states. In a 1980 case, the Oklahoma 
Court refused to apply a Kansas statute of limitation to an 
original probate of a will where disposition of property in 
Oklahoma was at issue. That Court stated that: 
Finally, in regard to any question which exists 
concerning the applicability of the Kansas one-year 
statute of limitation to the proceedings in this case, 
it is well settled that 'ordinarily, with respect to 
limitation of actions, the law of the forum governs.' 
Edison v. Lewis, 325 P.2d 955 (Okl. 1958). Oklahoma 
has no applicable statute of limitation.42 
Here, the Oklahoma Court allowed a longer statute of limitation 
(no limit) than was permitted in the foreign state of Kansas (one 
year). The forum state's statutes apply to proceedings in the 
forum state. 
In a more recent case the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied 
it's own foreign judgment statues. In this case a Colorado 
judgment was filed in Oklahoma according to that states foreign 
judgment statutes. That Court stated: 
It is the procedure for enforcement that is being 
activated, not the validity of the original 
jurisdiction of the judgment. 
41
 Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 at 45-46. 
42
 Mitchell v. Cloyes, 620 P.2d 398, 402 (Okla. 1980). 
17 
We, therefore, hold that the rendition of judgment in 
the originating forum state starts the dormancy period 
running when the Uniform Act is called upon or brought into 
play. The Act in Oklahoma (12 O.S.1981, S 721) gives the 
foreign judgment the same effect as a judgment of this 
state. 
We shall treat the instant Colorado judgment, 
filled in Oklahoma as if it were rendered in Oklahoma 
on the same date it was rendered in Colorado. 
We hold, however, that foreign judgments, when 
filed pursuant to the Uniform Act, become judgments of 
this state for the purpose of enforcement. 
Consequently, the language in § 735 which refers to 
judgments "rendered" in Oklahoma should be construed to 
include foreign judgments also. Therefore, a foreign 
judgment which is filed in Oklahoma becomes dormant 
five (5) years after it was rendered in the sister 
state, If execution was never issued on the judgment in 
Oklahoma. The instant judgment was rendered in 
Colorado in January of 1977; as no execution was issued 
thereon it became dormant in Oklahoma in January, 1982. 
The date of filing of the foreign judgment is 
irrelevant in determining whether it has become dormant 
in Oklahoma. . . . By the time the creditor filed in 
1982, the Colorado judgment had become dormant, and the 
act of filing the judgment did nothing to revive the 
judgment. The filing was effective, the Colorado 
judgment was still valid, but unless the creditor had 
execution issue within the five (5) year period after 
the judgment was rendered, the judgment was 
unenforceable in Oklahoma.4 3 
Oklahoma administers it local statutes when it comes to foreign 
judgment enforcement within that state. Yet, in the case at bar, 
this Court is asked to enforce Oklahoma's statute of limitation 
within the State of Utah. 
43
 First of Denver Morta. Investors v. Riqqs, 692 P.2d 
1358, 1361-63 (Okla. 1984). 
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The defendant in this case wants this Court to ignore the 
overwhelming weight of established procedure in conflicts of law 
cases and have the Utah Court apply Oklahoma statute of 
limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in granting the Motion Dismissing 
Action and Vacating Judgement for the defendants, A valid 
foreign judgment properly filed under the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act should be given identical treatment as if it were a domestic 
judgment. 
THEREFORE, for the reasons stated hssrein the 
Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah to reverse the Motion to Dismiss Action and 
Vacate Judgment granted to the Defendant/Respondent, and remand 
this action to the District Court for a finding that the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act is the appropriate law for enforcing foreign 
judgments. 
da] 
ZABRISKIE, PATTON & PETRO 
Respectively submitted this •y ^-^  y of September, 1989. 
l/M^i( 
Michael J. Petro 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 1 
A l - 1 
Note 6 
by court on execution growing out of 
another action was not void. Id. 
7. Public lands 
Secretary of Interior's retention of 
right of approval of transfer of lease 
executed under federal statute did not 
prevent levy of general execution pursu-
ant to judgment declaring lien against 
owner of interest in lease, nor prevent 
confirmation of execution sale subject to 
right of approval by Secretary of Interi-
or. Melish Consul. Placer Oil Mining 
Ass'n in Red River v. Buik-Senator Oil 
Co., 163 Okl. 20, 20 P.2d 879 (1933). 
8. Third persons ' property 
Shotgun which was placed in keeping 
of judgment debtor when owner of shot-
gun borrowed money from the judgment 
debtor was not subject to execution levy 
by judgment debtor's judgment credi-
tors. Turner v. Brown, 197 Okl. 638, 173 
P.2d 943 (1946). 
9. Trust estates 
Husband, acquiring legal title to wife's 
separate land, holds it in trust for her 
benefit, and it is not subject to execution 
on judgment against him. Weitz v. Rich-
ardson, 125 Okl. 294, 258 P. 262 (1927). 
§ 7 3 4 . Property bound after seizure 
All real estate not bound by the lien of the judgment, as well as 
goods and chattels of the debtor, shall be bound from the time they 
shall be seized in execution. 
R.L.1910, § 5152. 
Source: 
St.1893, § 4336. 
St. 1903, § 4634. 
Comp.Laws 1909, § 5968. 
Historical Note 
Comp.St.1921, § 694. 
St.1931, § 441. 
Origin: Gen.St.Kan.1889, par. 4541. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Judgment lien on after-acquired prop-
erty; priorities. 2 Okl. Law Rev. 518 
(Nov. 1949). 
Library References 
Execution *»109. 
C.J.S. Executions § 123. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Preface. 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 1 
1. In general 
Land is bound from time it is seized 
under oiiginal execution, and alias writ 
relates back to levy under first execu-
tion. Storrie v. McAlester Fuel Co., 
C.C.A., 133 F.2d 1003 (1943). 
Where after dismissal of alleged credi-
tor's injunction which had restrained 
sale of Oklahoma land under judgment 
creditor's execution, a second execution 
was issued on the Judgment, creditor's 
involuntary bankruptcy petition against 
judgment debtor filed more than four 
months after first execution and within 
four months from second execution was 
properly dismissed, since under this sec-
tion, lien under first execution bound 
the land continuously thereafter, and 
neither the debtor's permitting acquis!-
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tion of such lien, nor the enforcement 
tlieieof wilhin four months' period con-
stituted an "act of bankruptcy" Storrie 
v. McAlester Fuel Co., C.C.A., 133 F.2d 
1003 (1943). 
St. 1893, § 4336 (sec, now, this sec-
tion) piovidcd that chattels wete to be 
bound by the lien of a judgment "from 
the time they shall be seized in execu-
tion," and the lien of an attachment is-
sued out of the district court and levied 
on a stock of goods by the deputy sheriff 
had priority over that of an execution 
issued out of the probate couit on the 
same goods, and placed in the sheriff's 
hands before, but not levied until alter, 
the levy by the deputy. Burnham v 
Dickson, 5 Okl. 112, 47 P. 1059 (1897). 
§ 7 3 5 . Must be issued within five years or Judgment becomes 
dormant—Inapplicable to municipalities 
If execution is not issued and filed or a garnishment summons 
issued as provided in Section 759 of this title within five (5) years 
after the date of any judgment that now is or may hereafter be 
rendered in any coutt of record in this state, or if five (5) years ha; 
intervened between the date that the last execution on such judg 
ment was filed or the date that the last garnishment summons wai 
issued as provided by Section 759 of this title, and the date that wri 
of execution was filed or a garnishment summons was issued a 
also provided in Section 759 of this title, such judgment shal 
become unenforceable and of no effect, and shall cease to operat 
as a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtor. Provided, tha 
this section shall not apply to judgments against municipalities 
R.L. 1910, § 5153. Laws 1981, c. 120, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 22, § 1, eff. No^  
1, 1988. 
Historical Note 
The 1981 amendment substituted "is 
not issued and filed as provided in Sec-
tion 759 of this title" for "shall not be 
sued out"; substituted "has intervened 
between the date that the last execution 
on such judgment was filed as provided 
by Section 759 of this title and the date 
the writ of execution was filed as also 
provided in Section 759 of this title" for 
"shall have intervened between the date 
of the last execution issued on such judg-
ment and the time of serving out anoth-
er writ of execution thereon"; substitut-
ed "such judgment shall become unen-
forceable and of no effect" for "such 
judgment shall become dormant"; and 
inserted "real" preceeding "estate". 
The 1988 amendment, in the first sen-
tence, inserted "or a garnishment sum-
mons issued" following "not issued and 
filed", "or the date that the last garnish-
ment summons was issued" following 
"judgment was filed" and "or a garnis 
ment summons was issued" followii 
"writ of execution was filed." 
Severability clauses, codification, i 
peal of conflicting laws and eff< 
tlve/operatrve date provisions 
Section 6 of Laws 1981, c. 120 pi 
vides that this act shall become effecti 
October 1, 1981. 
Section 3 of Laws 1988, c. 22 provic 
for an effective date. 
Source: 
St.1893, § 4337. 
St.1903, § 4635. 
Comp.Laws 1909, § 5969. 
Comp.St.1921, § 695. 
St.1931, § 442. 
Origin: Gen.St.Kan.1889, par. 4542 
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Cross References 
Discharge of money judgment liens upon appeal to Supreme Court, see § 706.2 of 
this title. 
Unemployment compensation, warrant filed for! payment of delinquent contribu-
tions as lien, see title 40, § 3-503. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Annual Survey of Oklahoma Law: 
Conflict of Laws—Uniform Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments Act. 2 Okl. City 
U.L.Rev. 98 (1977). 
Evolution of Real Property Law rclat 
ing to lis pendens and judgment liens, 
Dale L. Astle. 32 Okl.L.Rev. 812 (1979) 
Judgment liens: New legislation. El 
bridge D. Phelps. 50 Okl.B.J. 404 (1979) 
Judgments: Effect of modification of 
original judgment oi\ dormant judgment 
statute. 34 Okl.L.Rev. 413 (1981). 
1983 decisions of interest pertaining to 
real property. Martha L. Marshall. 55 
Okl.BJ. 699 (1984). 
Statute governing judgments filed in 
other counties, suggested by Bar Associa-
tion committee. 23 Okl. Bar Journal 
1412 (Aug. 30, 1952). 
Library References 
Judgment «=»853. 
C.J.S. Judgments § 532. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Preface. 
Notes of Decisions 
After-acquired property 8 
Ancillary proceedings 9 
Bankruptcy 10 
Burden of proof 24 
Cloud on title I f 
Construction and application 3 
Creditors' bill 12 
Dormant Judgment 4 
Estoppel 25 
Foreclosure actions 14 
Foreign Judgments 13 
Fraud 15 
Money Judgments 16 
Municipalities 21 
Obligations to state 23 
Partial payment 17 
Purpose 2 
Running of period 5 
School di»lrlct§ 22 
Special assessment Hen 18 
Successive executions 6 
Sufficiency of execution 7 
Unemployment compensation tax war-
rants 19 
Validity 1 
Workers' compensation awards 20 
1. Validity 
Refusal of district court to permit 
creditor to enforce filed but unexecuted 
foreign judgment in Oklahoma after dor-
mancy period had expired did not vio-
late full faith and credit clause of United 
States Constitution or due process clause 
of United States and Oklahoma Constitu-
tions. First of Denver Mortg. Investors 
v. Riggs, Okl., 692 P.2d 1358 (1984). 
This section providing that judgment 
shall become dormant if execution shall 
not be sued out within five years after 
date of any judgment is applicable 
against the state, and as so applied did 
not conflict with constitutional provision 
that legislature shall have no power to 
extinguish the indebtedness of any cor-
poration or individual to the state. 
Charles Banfield Co. v. State ex rel. Fal-
lis, Okl., 525 P.2d 638 (1974). 
2. Purpose 
The purpose of this section was to 
require party obtaining final determina-
tion of rights to exercise those rights 
within i five years and to bar right to 
process for enforcement of judgment in 
absence of issuance of execution within 
five years. North v. Haning, 204 Okl. 
321, 229 P.2d 574 (1951). 
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3. Construction and application 
In granting right to have judgment 
lien, legislature can prescribe conditions 
that must be met by judgment creditor 
to prevent dormancy of his judgment. 
First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. 
Riggs, Okl., 692 P.2d 1358 (1984). 
Amendment in dormancy statute (this 
section) which made it consistent with 
prior repeal of revivor statutes did not 
affect any accrued right of judgment 
creditor or take away any cause of ac-
tion of creditor who had no right to 
bring revival action at any time. First of 
Denver Mortg. Investors v. Riggs, Okl., 
692 P.2d 1358 (1984). 
This section prescribing limitations in 
actions on judgments is restriction on 
common-law right of action on judg-
ment. Chandler-Frates St Reitz v. Kos-
tich, Okl., 630 P.2d 1287 (1981). 
There is no limitation other than that 
of dormancy statute upon effective dura-
tion of a judgment. Id. 
In granting right to action on judg-
ment which did not exist at common 
law, legislature can prescribe certain 
conditions which must be met by all 
judgment creditors if dormancy is to be 
prevented and lien of judgment to be 
continued. Id. 
Statute of limitation is one of repose 
and holder of right of action cannot, by 
any act on his part, disturb the quies-
cence produced by running of period of 
limitations, while dormancy statute con-
stitutes condition imposed upon holder 
of judgment which adheres to and is part 
of judgment. Id. 
Dormancy statute (this section) contin-
ued to run on original judgment which 
erroneously assessed prejudgment inter-
est at rate of 10% per annum instead of 
6% statutory rate, since the trial court 
was without authority, not without juris-
diction, to assess prejudgment interest at 
the 10% rate, and since the court's subse-
quent entry of order correcting the bal-
ance due under the judgment was mere-
ly a clerical act, as opposed to modifica-
tion of a void judgment and entry of a 
new judgment. Id. 
The legislature can fix certain condi-
tions or requirements that must be met 
by all judgment creditors if dormancy is 
to be prevented and the lien of a judg-
ment is to be continued. State ex rel. 
T.12 O.S.A. M «30 to 1030-* 2 
Sebring v. Sterling, 198 Okl. 398, 179 
P.2d 125 (1947). 
This section is not a "statute of limita-
tion" within rule that statutes of limita-
tion are not binding on the state, but is a 
"dormancy statute". State ex rel. Sebr-
ing v. Sterling, 198 Okl. 398, 179 P.2d 
125 (1947). 
4. Dormant judgment 
A "dormant judgment," for purposes 
of this section, is one that remains unsat-
isfied but that has remained unexecuted 
so long that execution cannot be issued 
upon it without first reviving the judg-
ment. Palmer v. Belford, Okl., 527 P.2d 
589 (1974). 
Judgment is not dormant at issuance 
of alias execution, if five years did not 
intervene since original execution, and 
original execution issued within five 
years from judgment. Ashur v. 
McCreery, 150 Okl. I l l , 300 P. 767 
(1931). 
Execution cannot be issued on judg-
ment becoming dormant after five years. 
Miller v. Melone, 11 Okl. 241, 67 P. 479 
(1902). 
5. Running of period 
Dormancy statute, if applicable, did 
not start to run until after entry of defi-
ciency judgment; and where deficiency 
judgment had been entered less than five 
years before filing of motion to set it 
aside, motion was timely, even though 
filed more than five years after entry of 
original judgment foreclosing mortgage 
and Hen on attached property not cover 
ed by mortgage. Ingerton v. First Na 
tional Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa, C.A 
Okl., 291 F.2d 662 (1961). 
A judgment on which execution wai 
issued after affirmance by Oklahoma Su 
preme Court five years after date o 
judgment was not dormant under Okla 
homa statute so that execution could nc 
be issued, where order overruling mc 
tion for new trial had been entered dui 
ing five-year period, since that orde 
stayed execution for 30 days thereaftei 
as respects validity of judgment unde 
Bankruptcy Act. In re Cherokee Publi 
Service Co., D.C.Ark., 20 F.Supp. 19 
(1937), affirmed 94 F.2d 536. 
Rendition of judgment in originatlr 
forum state starts dormancy period rui 
ning when Uniform Enforcement of Fo 
IZ 9 / 3 / CIVIL, F K U C l i J U U I U i 
The 1987 amendment redesignated 
subsection A, as subsection A, patagiaph 
1; redesignated items 1 to 3 as items a to 
c; insetted "executed by the sheriff fol-
lowing "written notice of sale" in item a; 
inserted "shall be executed by the sheriff 
and" following "The notice" in the sec-
ond sentence of item b; substituted 
"published in the county, or in case no 
newspaper be published therein" for 
"printed in the county, or in case no 
newspaper be printed therein" in the 
third sentence of item b; added para-
graph 2 under subsection A; redesigna-
ted subsection B as subsection B, para-
graph 2; and added subsection B, para-
graph 1. 
Source: 
St.1893, § 4343. 
St. 1903, § 4641. 
Comp.Laws 1909, § 5975. 
Comp.St.1921, § 701. 
St.1931, § 448. 
Origin: Gen.St.Kan.1889, par. 4548. 
Cross References 
Realty, notice of sale of, see § 764 of this title. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Secured transactions: Commercial collateral after default under UCC 
reasonability of secured party's sale of § 9-504(3). 29 Okl.L.Rev. 486 (1976). 
Execution <s=»222. 
CJ.S. Executions § 211. 
Library References 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Preface. 
Notes of Decisions 
Notice of sale f 
Place of sale 2 
1. Notice of sale 
Sale of attached chattels, in absence of 
personal service of summons or appear-
ance by defendant where case does not 
allow service by publication, is void. 
Empire Supply Co. v. McCann, 127 Okl. 
195, 260 P. 44 (1927). 
All parties must rely on and be gov-
erned by notice given of time, place, and 
manner of judicial sale, duly published 
as required by law. Dickinson-Reed-
Randerson Co. v. Markley, 117 Okl. 17, 
244 P. 754 (1926). 
Parties Interested in judicial sale have 
no right to rely on agreement made with 
officers, whose duty it is to conduct sale, 
that he will notify them of exact time of 
sale. Id. 
Notice for ten days is to give mortga-
gor opportunity to pay debt and extin-
guish lien. Litz v. Exchange Bank of 
Alva, 15 Okl. 564, 83 P. 790 (1906). 
2. Place of sale 
On general execution personal proper-
ty is sold where It is located. Brown v. 
Neustadt, 145 Okl. 140. 292 P. 73 (1930). 
§ 7 5 8 . Further levy when property taken Insufficient 
When any writ shall issue, directing the sale of property previous-
ly taken in execution, the officer issuing said writ shall, at the 
request of the person entitled to the benefit thereof, his agent or 
attorney, add thereto a command to the officer to whom such writ 
shall be directed, that if the property remaining in his hands not 
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sold shall, in his opinion, be insufficient to satisfy the judgment, he 
shall levy the same upon lands and tenements, goods and chattels, 
or either, as the law shall permit, being the property of the judg-
ment debtor, sufficient to satisfy the debt. 
R.L.1910, § 5160. 
Historical Note 
Source: Comp.St.1921, § 702. 
St.1893, § 4344. St.1931, § 449. 
St. 1903. § 4642. 
Comp.Laws 1909. § 5976. Origin: St.Kan.1889, par. 4549. 
Library References 
Execution <3=M36. 
CJ.S. Executions § 103. 
§ 7 5 9 . Filing and Indexing of execution—Appraisement ol 
property—Extension of Judgment lien 
A. When a general execution is issued and placed in the custody 
of a sheriff for levy, a certified copy of such execution shall be filed 
in the office of the county clerk of the county whose sheriff hold-
such execution and shall be indexed the same as judgments. 
B. If a general or special execution is levied upon lands anc 
tenements, the sheriff shall endorse on the face of the writ the lega 
description and shall have three disinterested persons who hav< 
taken an oath to impartially appraise the property so levied on 
upon actual view; and such disinterested persons shall return to th 
officer their signed estimate of the real value of said property 
C. To extend a judgment lien beyond the initial or any subse 
quent statutory period, prior to the expiration of such period, one o 
the following shall be filed and indexed in the same manner a 
judgments in the office of the county clerk in the county in whic 
the judgment was rendered and in the office of the county clerk ii 
each county in which the judgment was filed and the lien thereof i 
sought to be retained: 
1. a certified copy of a general execution upon the judgment; c 
2. a certified copy of a garnishment summons issued against th 
judgment debtor. 
R.L.1910, § 5161. Laws 1981, c. 120, § 2; Laws 1988, c. 22, § 2, eff. No 
1, 1988. 
Historical Note 
The 1981 amendment rewrote this sec- "If execution be levied upon lands ai 
tion which prior thereto read: tenements, the officer levying such e? 
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cution shall c,all an inquest of three dis-
interested rhousehoIders, who shall be 
resident within the county where the 
lands taken in execution are situate, and 
administer to them an oath, impartially 
to appraise the property so levied on, 
upon actual view; and such household-
ers shall forthwith return to said officer, 
under their hands, an estimate of the 
real value of said property." 
The 1988 amendment rewrote subsec-
tion C which prior thereto read: 
"C. To extend a judgment lien be-
yond the initial or any subsequent statu-
tory period, prior to the expiration of 
such period, a certified copy of a general 
execution thereon shall be filed and in-
dexed in the same manner as judgments 
in the office of the county clerk in the 
county in which the judgment was ren-
dered and in the office of the county 
clerk in each county in which the judg-
ment was filed and the lien thereof is 
sought to be retained." 
Source: 
St 1893, § 4345. 
St. 1903, § 4643. 
Comp.Laws 1909, § 5977. 
Comp.SU921, § 703. 
St.1931, § 450. 
Origin: Gen.St.Kan.1889, par. 4550. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Title examination. Robert D. Crowe. 
30 Okl. Bar Journal 2192 (Dec. 1959). 
Execution «=>141. 
Judgment «=>770, 795(2). 
Library References 
C.J.S. Executions § 106. 
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 468, 490. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Preface. 
Notes of Decisions 
Appraisal 3-6 
In general 3 
Defects and Irregularities 5 
Disqualification of appraisers 6 
Incumbered property 4 
Defects and irregularities, appraisal 5 
Disqualification of appraisers, apprais-
al 6 
Incumbered property, appraisal 4 
Lands and tenements 1 
Personalty 2 
Return 7 
Review 8 
1. Lands and tenements 
A mineral deed amounts to a separate 
estate and is an "interest in land" within 
statute under classification of lands and 
tenements so as to require appraisement 
before sale thereof upon execution and 
levy. Cornelius v. Jackson, Okl., 209 
P.2d 166 (1949), appeal dismissed 69 
S.Ct. 412, 335 U.S. 906, 93 L.Ed. 440. 
Undivided half-interest in mineral 
rights and unaccrued royalties under 
mineral deed was "lands and tenements" 
under statute requiring appraisement of 
"lands and tenements" before sale on 
execution. Cuff v. Koslosky, 165 Okl. 
135, 25 P.2d 290 (1933). 
Equity in land seized on execution 
must be appraised. Hewitt v. Voils, 147 
Okl. 270, 296 P. 447 (1931). 
2. Personalty 
Appraisal of personalty upon which 
levy was made was not prerequisite to 
sale. Barker v. West Pub. Co., Okl., 268 
P.2d 248 (1954). 
3. Appraisal—In general 
Appraisement of realty under order of 
sale with appraisement in foreclosure 
proceeding, which fixed total appraised 
value at certain sum, "less taxes $ , 
net appraised value $ ," was suffi-
cient, In absence of evidence showing 
some taxes against the property. Taylor 
v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n 
of Oklahoma City, 184 Okl. 600, 89 P.2d 
349 (1939). 
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Note 
As respects objections to confirmation 
of sale, where mortgaged property is ap-
praised by householders and is sold at 
not less than two-thirds of appraised val-
ue, sale is valid, as respects question of 
sale price, and court cannot inquire into 
adequacy thereof so long as appraise-
ment is permitted to stand. Rodolf v. 
First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, 182 
Okl. 426, 78 P.2d 296 (1938). 
Where the court in a suit for specific 
performance of a land contract imposes 
a lien for taxes and assessments which 
the purchaser should have paid and 
which the vendor has paid to protect the 
title, and provides for special execution 
if the purchaser fails to pay within a 
specified time, this section requires ap-
praisement before sale. Bell v. Trosper, 
182 Okl. 316, 77 P.2d 544 (1938). 
As regards validity of execution sale 
where amount of taxes, penalty, and cost 
delinquent on property is in excess of 
appraised value thereof, such property is 
properly listed on appraisement as being 
of no value. Wedgwood v. Boyd, 174 
Okl. 531, 51 P.2d 299 (1935). 
An order of sale under a final judg-
ment is a species of execution and for 
such reason real estate sold thereunder 
should be appraised in accordance with 
statutory requirements applying to sales 
under execution. Given v. Owen, 73 
Okl. 146, 175 P. 345 (1918). 
Where, under the provisions of R.L. 
1910, § 5177 (see, now, § 751 of this 
title), execution was levied upon land 
incumbered by mortgage, it was the duty 
of the appraisers to estimate and return 
the value of the property subject to the 
mortgage, which was the value of the 
rights and interests of the mortgagor 
debtor in such property which alone 
could be sold, and a sale thereof for 
two-thirds or more of such appraised 
value was valid. Alexander v. American 
Nat. Bank, 54 Okl. 345, 153 P. 130 
(1916). 
4. Incumbered property, apprais-
al 
In execution sale of incumbered land, 
debtor's equity in land over and above 
incumbrance should be appraised. Mil-
ler v. American Bank it Trust Co., 171 
Okl. 99, 40 P.2d 1074 (1935). 
Sale of land on mortgage foreclosure 
without appraisement, in absence of 
waiver thereof, is void. Brown v. Sta 
Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 133 Okl. 173, 21 
P. 833 (1928). 
Waiver in mortgages of benefits * 
homestead exemption and "stay law 
held not equivalent to waiving apprais 
ment before sale on foreclosure. Id. 
5. Defects and Irregularities, a 
pralsal 
Denial of defendant's motion to vaco 
an execution sale of his realty on gTour 
that it was not appraised by three a 
praisers as required by this section, b 
cause one of appraisers did not actual 
view the realty, was not reversible errc 
where evidence did not show that pri 
for which realty was sold was disprop* 
tionate to the real value thereof, or tr 
strict compliance with statute wot 
have resulted in a different value bei 
placed on the realty by the appraise 
Baker v. Smith, 191 Okl. 491, 131 P.2d 
(1942). 
6. Disqualification of appraise 
appraisal 
That one of appraisers of mortgap 
property prior to foreclosure sale h 
been issued a card by sheriff, purporti 
to be an appointment of that apprar 
as a deputy sheriff, did not invalid 
appraisement, where appraiser receh 
no salary as a deputy, never made 
rests nor served process, and card v 
considered merely as a courtesy ca 
Rodolf v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 
Tulsa, 182 Okl. 426, 78 P.2d 296 (193 
7. Return 
Mortgage foreclosure sale was not 
valid because return of appraisem 
failed to separately mention buildi] 
affixed to land, when buildings w 
considered by appraisers as part of n 
ty and were again specifically mentioi 
and considered in sale of persona 
Zenith Limestone Co. v. Exchange Ti 
Co., 175 Okl. 185, 51 P.2d 823 (19. 
8. Review 
A finding of trial court in mortg 
foreclosure proceeding that no gro 
inadequate valuation had been pla 
upon mortgaged property by apprai 
would not be disturbed where It was 
clearly against weight of evidence, 
dolf v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co 
Tulsa, 182 Okl. 426, 78 P.2d 296 (19 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
ENERGY CATALYST CO. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL W. MARTIN, 
Defendant. 
82-C-496-BT 
? | L E D 
c.\j ?7. \%b 
^ i P / 'Cv "/ 4 
y 
J U D G M E N T 
r( r 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed this 
date, IT IS ORDERED Judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff, 
Energy Catalyst Co., and against the defendant, Carl W. Martin, in 
the amount of $27,500.00, together with interest from July 17, 1981, 
at the rate of 670 per annum, and interest at the rate of 157o per 
annum from the date of Judgment until paid, in accordance with 12 
O.S. (1982) §727. ^ 
ENTERED this **-' ^ay of September, 1982. 
r 
TlfoMASRTBRETT 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
United States District Court T^fl 
Northern District of Oklahoma) v. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing 
is a true COBV C . ti.e ordinal on file 
in this Court. ..,_._
 n, or,v 
AO 132 (Rev. 2/81) Exemplification Certificate 
llmtrti States itatrirt Ohrort 
for the 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
I, JACK C SILVER , Clerk of the United States District Court for the 
NORTHERN District of OKLAHOMA , and keeper of the records and seal thereof, hereby 
certify that the documents attached hereto are true copies of Judgment i n c a s e f 8 2 - C - 4 9 6 - B 
now remaining among the records of the Court. 
In testimony whereof I hereunto sign my name and affix the seal of said Court, in said District at T u l s a 
Okl ahoma , this 13 day of ^Mfluaj ^ 87 
Clerk. 
I, THOMAS R BRETT , United States District Judge for the 
NORTHERN District of—OKLAHOMA , do hereby certify that, 
whose name is above written and subscribed, is and was at the date thereof, Clerk of said Court, duly 
appointed and sworn, and keeper of the records and seal thereof, and that the above certificate by him 
made, and his attestation or record thereof, is in due form of law. 
A u g u s t 1JL , 19_£_Z t^L 
United States District Judge. 
I, JACK C SILVER 
NORTHERN District of OKLAHOMA 
the Honorable _ 
was on the 21 
THOMAS R BRETT 
. day of S e p t e m b e r 
_ , Clerk of the United States District Court for the 
, and keeper of the seal thereof, hereby certify that 
whose name is within written and subscribed, 
19 82 , and now is Judge of said court, 
duly appointed, confirmed, sworn, and qualifed; and that I am well acquainted with his handwriting and 
official signature and know and hereby certify the same within written to be his. 
In testimony whereof I hereunto sign my name, and affix the seal ofsaidCourt at the city OLL_TUL S A 
OKLAHOMA , in said State, on this J_3 day of .Aup^srf ^ j < 8 7 
Clerk. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D I S t R f c t " ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Energy Catalyst Co., 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Carl W. Martin, 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO CV-87-1916 
TO: 
Carl W. Martin 
590 East 900 South 
Mapleton, Utah 84663 
Notice is hereby given to you that a Judgment was this date filed against 
you in the above entitled matter. Filing parties are as follows: 
Judgment Creditor Energy Catalyst Co. 
Address: P.O. Box 256, West Chester, Pennsylvania 19381 
Creditor's Attorney Jeril B. Wilson 
Address: 3325 N. Univ. Ave., Suite 200 
Jamestown Sq., Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Dated this 24th day of August 19 87 
BY THE COURT 
WILLIAM F. HUISH, CLERK 
JELY. fy<MfynC 
Dwayne Case, Chief Deputy Clerk 
ADDENDUM 4 
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Judgment against the defendant in the amount of $27,500 together 
with interest from July 17, 1981, at the rate of 6% per annum and 
interest at the rate of 15% per annum from September 21, 1982, 
until paid, which Judgment has not been satisfied. 
DATED this ^ / ^ d a v of September, 1987. 
:i/C tfol~-
ILSON 
ey for Plaintiff 
ORDER 
Upon application of plaintiff herein, and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named defendant, Carl 
W. Martin, appear before this Court in the Courtroom thereof, Provo, 
Utah, on the 9th day of October, 1987, at the hour of BSffi^  a.m., then 
and there to answer concerning the property of the defendant. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending a hearing on this Order, 
said defendant is hereby restrained from disposing of his non-
exempt property, including money. 
DATED this X ^ day of September, 
ADDENDUM 5 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
SERVED: C a r \ VA3. V Y l a r T \ l o DATE RECEIVED: ^ / ^ / ^ 
HOME: 590 { . ^ O O S . ^ c x p ^ ^ ^ ^ 
WORK: 
LEFTWITH: LO\-Pe, DATE SERVED: ^ 3 0 / ^ " 7 
PROCESS: n ^ - V v o n c W O n d k t r ' i n S u p p k m e n - k L l 
PrOC££d\r*p£> . 
REQUESTED BY:OfcJrv\ ' R U 3 v \ s a 7 ^ : ~ CASE: £ n e r a v / ( k i - a - L / & V - V 
G ^ Y pocx v 4 \ ^ 
PLAINTIFF: ? a n £ n e r g y DEFENDANT: Q ^ \ tf>. m a r f \A 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
/ / P E R S O N A L SERVICE by leaving a copy with the respondent in 
person. 
H^ P E R S O N A L SERVICE by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age 
and discretion residing at the usual place of abode of the respondent s; 
/ / ON A CORPORATION OR PARTNERSHIP or institution by leaving a 
copy with a known agent or officer or some other qualifying agent as 
listed in rule 4 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
/ / OTHER SERVICE 
I served upon the respondent listed above on the date shown above in the 
manner indicated above the process described above. I was at the time of this 
service a duly qualified and action peace officer or a person over the age of 21 
years and not a party to this action. I endorsed on the copy served the date and 
place of service, and my name and official title if any. 
Fees: 
Service: 3 - 7^> 
Mileage: 7- 5"0 
Other: 
Total: $ fl-<P5 
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SECRETARY OF STATE 
STATE OF MONTANA 
RESTATED CERTIFICATE OP INCORPORATION 
I , JIM WALTERMIRE, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e of t he S t a t e of 
M o n t a n a , do h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t t h e R e s t a t e d A r t i c l e s of 
I n c o r p o r a t i o n of ENERGY CATALYST COMPANY, a Montana 
c o r p o r a t i o n , and S ta tement on Adoption t he reon duly executed 
p u r s u a n t to the p r o v i s i o n s of Sec t i on 35-1-213» Montana Code 
A n n o t a t e d , have been r e c e i v e d in my o f f i c e and conform t o 
law. 
NOV, THEREFORE, I , JIM WALTERMIRE, as such S e c r e t a r y 
of S t a t e , by v i r t u e of t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d in me by l a w , 
he reby i s s u e t h i s Res t a t ed C e r t i f i c a t e of I n c o r p o r a t i o n to 
ENERGY CATALYST COMPANY c h a n g i n g i t s n a m e t o 
PAH ENERGY RESOURCES, I N C . , a M o n t a n a c o r p o r a t i o n , and 
a t t a c h h e r e t o a copy of t h e R e s t a t e d A r t i c l e s of 
I n c o r p o r a t i o n and the S ta tement on Adoption t h e r e o n . 
ADDENDDM 7 
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ENERGY CATALYST CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL W. MARTIN, 
Defendant. 
APR 2 3',$$' 
Jack C. Silver, Clerk 
N 0
- •!. S. DISTRICT COIPV 
8 2 - C - 4 9 6 - B 
COMPLAINT 
Comes now the plaintiff, Energy Catalyst Co., and 
for claim for relief against the above named defendant shows 
unto the Court as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Energy Catalyst Co,, is a Montana 
corporation, qualified to do business in Oklahoma and 
headquartered in Oklahoma. The defendant is a citizen of 
the State of Utah and the amount in controversy exceeds 
$10,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs. 
2. Jurisdiction of this United States District 
Court is founded upon the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1332. 
3. On or about July 17, 1981, in the corporate 
offices of the plaintiff, the plaintiff loaned the defendant 
$27,500.00. 
4. Subsequent to July 17, 1981, the plain-tiff _ 
made repeated demands on the defendant for repayment but 
ADDENDUM 8 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
-0-
Case No. 82-C-496-D 
ANSWER 
ENERGY 
-vs-
CARL W. 
CATALYST CO., ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
. MARTIN, ) 
Defendant. ) 
-0-
COMES NOW the above named defendant and answers the 
complaint of plaintiff on file herein as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
That the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject 
m a t- f- <=» r- r\f 4-U ^ -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __^  day of May, -1982, 
I served a copy of the within and foregoing ANSWER upon: 
Patrick J. Malloy III, L'sq. 
2431 East 51st Street, £103 
Tulsa, Oklahoma 7410p 
attorney of record in the above-entitled action, by depositing 
a copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in 
an envelope addressed to said attorney at the foregoing address. 
/s/ Carl W. Martin 
Carl W. Martin 
ADDENDUM 9 
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F I L b D 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA JUL 14 1988 -
PAN ENERGY, f/k/a ) jack C. Silver, Clerk 
ENERGY CATALYST CO., ) y.s. DISTRICT COURT 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. ) No. 82-C-496-B 
CARL W. MARTIN, ) 
Defendant. ) 
O R D E R 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Carl W. 
Martin's Motion to Extinguish Judgment.1 
On September 21, 1982, this Court awarded Plaintiff judgment 
against Defendant in the amount of $27,500.00. Subsequently, the 
Plaintiff has filed the judgment in both Utah and in Idaho. After 
filing the judgment in Idaho a writ of execution was issued in 
Idaho, but never filed. However, nothing in the Plaintiff's 
response brief indicates an attempt to enforce this judgment in 
Oklahoma. 
Process to enforce a money judgment rendered by a federal 
district court is usually a writ of execution under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
69, with the procedure on execution conforming to the practice and 
procedure of the state in which the District Court sits, except to 
the extent that an applicable federal statute provides otherwise.2 
The Court does not find authority to extinguish judgment. The 
Oklahoma Statutes refer to a judgment becoming dormant. 
For a list of federal statutes which govern executions, see 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 69. 
7 Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice 569.04[3], citing Fink v. O'Neill. 
106 U.S. 272, 1 S.Ct. 325, 27 L.Ed. 196 (1882). The court 
determines that no federal statute is applicable. Therefore, state 
law governs on this issue before the court. 
The effective duration of a judgment is limited by the state's 
dormancy statute. Oklahoma's dormancy statute is codified at 12 
O.S. 1981 §735: 
"If execution is not issued and filed as 
provided in Section 759 of this title, within 
five (5) years after the date of any judgment 
that now is or may hereafter be rendered, in 
any court of record in this state, or if five 
(5) years has intervened between the date that 
the last execution on such judgment was filed 
as provided by Section 759 of this title and 
the date that writ of execution was filed as 
also provided in Section 759 of this title, 
such judgment shall become unenforceable and 
of no effect, and shall cease to operate as a 
lien on the real estate of the judgment 
debtor...." 
and §739: 
"A. When a general execution is issued and 
placed in the custody of a sheriff for levy, 
a certified copy of such execution shall be 
filed in the office of the county clerk of the 
county whose sheriff holds such execution and 
shall be indexed the same as judgments. 
"B. If a general or special execution is 
levied upon lands and tenements, the sheriff 
shall endorse on the face of the writ the legal 
description and shall have three disinterested 
persons who have taken an oath to impartially 
appraise the property so levied on, upon actual 
view; and such disinterested persons shall 
return to the officer their signed estimate of 
the real value of said property. 
"C. To extend a judgment lien beyond the 
initial or any subsequent statutory period, 
prior to the expiration of such period, a 
certified copy of a general execution thereon 
shall be filed and indexed in the same manner 
as judgments in the office of the county clerk 
2 
in the county in which the judgment was 
rendered and in the office of the county clerk 
in each county in which the judgment was filed 
and the lien thereof is sought to be retained." 
Any Oklahoma judgment may become unenforceable if not executed upon 
within five years from rendition of the judgment. First of Denver 
Mortgage Investors v. Riqqs, 692 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Okla. 1984). A 
judgment creditor who files but does not execute the judgment in 
Oklahoma cannot revive the judgment after it has become, dormant by 
making a second filing. Id. at 1362. A judgment becomes dormant 
when the judgment creditor fails to obtain a writ of execution on 
a judgment within five years of date of original judgment, even 
though the judgment debtor had made several attempts to satisfy the 
judgment by garnishment. Chandler-Frates & Reitz v. Kostich, 630 
P.2d 1287 (Okla. 1981). Oklahoma strictly applies her dormancy 
statutes to foreign judgments. First of Denver Mortgage Investors 
v. Riggs, 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984). Oklahoma's dormant judgment 
statutes are to be strictly construed and the courts generally 
refuse to engraft exceptions to them other than those contained in 
the statutes themselves. Thomas v. Murray, 49 P. 2d 1080 (Okla. 
1935). 
If the judgment is not executed on within the five-year period 
prescribed by statute, it becomes dormant and is not subject to 
being revived. Oklahoma's revivor statutes, 12 O.S. 1961, §§ 1071, 
1072 and 1077 were repealed in 1965 by Laws, 1965, Ch. 299, p. 535, 
and an attempted revivor after that date is a nullity, except to 
the extent of 12 O.S. 1971, §1081(b). Palmer v. Belford, 527 P.2d 
589, 590 (Okla. 1974). 
3 
The evidence before the Court reveals a writ of execution was 
issued in Minidoka County, Idaho on May 5, 1983, but was never 
filed in Idaho nor In Oklahoma. Plaintiff shows the execution was 
placed in the sherifffs hands but was returned with no property 
found. The writ was never filed. 
/SyThe Tenth Circuit affirms the application of Oklahoma's 
dormant judgment statutes. Inaerton v. First National Bank & Trust 
Co., 291 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1961). The statute is clear on its 
face that a writ of execution must be issued and filed in the State 
qf_Oklahoma within five years from the date of judgment. The 
Plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of 12 O.S. 1981 
§§ 735 and 759. Therefore, the judgment entered against Defendant 
on September 21, 1982 is unenforceable. ^ ) Defendant's Motion to 
Declare Judgment Dormant is sustained. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this //X-^ day of July, 1988. 
THOMAS R. BRETT ' 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
The Court does not rule on the enforceability of the judgment 
win Utah or Idaho. That issue is determined by Utah's and Idaho's 
law regarding foreign judgments and their enforceability. 
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